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When deciding who should receive welfare benefits with 
the aim to increase household well-being, it is necessary 
to understand the effects of the distribution of power 
within the households at which the aid is directed. Two 
primary household models have been used to study intra-
household bargaining and decision making: the unitary 
model and the collective model. The unitary model seems 
to fit Pakistan’s context because the prevailing traditional 
culture positions the male head as the household 
decision maker. However, using a set of direct measures 
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of decision-making power from the Pakistan Social and 
Living Standard Measurement Survey, this study finds 
that even in a country where men seem to have more 
power than women, the collective household bargaining 
model applies. This study also finds that, in Pakistan, 
when women have more decision-making power at home, 
households tend to spend more on women’s preferred 
goods (such as clothing and education), family members 
eat more non-grain food items, and children, particularly 
girls, are more likely to be enrolled in school. 
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1. Introduction  
Households are central to most policy initiatives aimed at reducing poverty because a 
significant portion of economic activity occurs within households. A clear understanding of the 
ways in which households make decisions is critical to the effective implementation of anti-
poverty programs. This is particularly important in developing countries since significant efforts 
go toward seeking the most efficient and effective ways to transfer income and other resources to 
poor households.  
When deciding who should receive welfare benefits with the aim to increase household well-
being, it is necessary to understand the effect of the distribution of power within the households 
at which the aid is directed. Two household models have been used to study intra-household 
bargaining and the decisions on child schooling, labor, and the allocation of consumption 
expenditures between private and public goods: classic unitary models and newer collective 
models. The former models are typically based on the notion that household preferences can be 
characterized by a single utility function; they assume either that there is a dictator or that 
household members have the same preferences and pool their resources to maximize the single 
utility function (Becker 1981). The collective models assume that different household members 
have distinct preferences and that final decisions fall somewhere along the spectrum between full 
cooperation and conflict, particularly when male and female heads of household are the decision 
makers (McElroy and Horney 1990; Chiappori 1992; Basu 2006).  
In Pakistan, the unitary model would seem to fit because the prevailing traditional cultural 
restrictions on women (Amin 1995; Hakim and Aziz 1998) often position the male head as the 
household decision maker. However, with economic growth and efforts to empower women in 
Pakistan in recent years, women’s roles have improved both within and outside households. 
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More women are getting education and are more involved in their employment decisions. Thus, 
in this context, a collective model is also plausible and the household human development 
investment is a function of women’s decision making power.  
One essential element of examining the association between women’s decision making 
power and human development investment is how to measure decision-making power. In the 
economic literature, decision-making and bargaining power are measured by the relative income 
of the male and female heads of household or by the ratio of number of school years completed 
by female to male head of household. The underlying assumption is that women who bring more 
income to households or women with a higher level of education are more likely to have greater 
bargaining power at home. However, these measures are often endogenous because income and 
education are major determinants of the budget share. On the other hand, the social science 
literature takes a much broader view on measurement of decision-making power; for example, 
Adato and others (2003) suggested that each member’s bargaining power is based on four factors: 
control over resources, influence over the bargaining process, interpersonal networks, and basic 
attitudinal attributes.  
One contribution of this study is the ability to use a set of more direct measures of decision-
making power from the Pakistan Social and Living Standard Measurement Survey, which asks 
directly who in the household makes decisions on key issues, such as women’s education and 
employment, the use of birth control, the number of children, and expenditures. These questions 
capture factors embedded in the bargaining process that income or education alone could not 
capture.  
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The study further examines the relationship between women’s decision-making power and 
some human development indicators, such as caloric availability and children’s education. The 
conventional assumption is that women have stronger preferences for child schooling, are more 
concerned about health outcomes, and tend to spend on collective consumption items such as 
food. These assumptions hold true in some empirical examinations, but recent work has 
challenged some of them (Felkey 2005; Basu 2006; Lancaster, Maitra et al. 2006). Basu (2006), 
using an intra-household theoretical framework, shows that if the woman has more decision-
making power than the man, the woman will have access to a greater share of the income 
produced by child labor and thus benefit from child labor. School enrollment might therefore 
decline as a result of increased child labor. Empirically, Maitra and Ray (2006) find that, in 
South Africa, there is no clear evidence that the identity of income earners affects household 
expenditures; and Felkey (2005) suggests that, in Bulgaria, the relationship between women’s 
bargaining power and household well-being is not monotonic.  
This study finds that in Pakistan, when women have more decision-making power at home, 
households tend to spend more on women’s preferred goods (such as clothing and education), 
families eat more non-grain food items, and children, particularly girls, are more likely to be 
enrolled in school.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the estimation strategies; section 3 
describes the data and variables; section 4 presents the results; and section 5 concludes.  
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2. The Estimation Strategy 
I first tested whether the unitary or the collective model applies to Pakistan’s context. To 
achieve that objective, I follow Lancaster et al. (2005)
2
 and conduct a joint Wald test of the null 
hypotheses in the following household budget share equation (1).  
 
     
    
      
        
                      
  
  
 
 
 
   
    
                                                       ,                                                            (1)  
in which b
g  
is the budget share of good g, θw  is women’s decision-making power, μ is 
household income, n is household size, and nk is the number of household members in the age-
sex class k. Additional details can be found in Lancaster et al (2005). In essence, the unitary 
model assumes that the decision-making power attached to each individual does not affect 
household expenditures; thus θ does not have any effect on the household expenditure patterns. 
This implies that       
  
    
     
      
            (2) 
If the above null hypotheses are rejected, the unitary model is rejected. It should also be 
noted that the test of the hypothesis must be conducted at different values of   , because the 
hypothesis is data dependent. Lancaster et al (2005) extend the collective approach to household 
behavior by using and estimating a model in which the decision-making power attached to 
individuals is endogenously determined. Following their approach, I also use three-stage least 
squares (3SLS) to jointly estimate women’s power, per capita household expenditure, and budget 
                                                          
2
 In Lancaster et al. (2005),    is measured by relative income.     is thus interpreted as women’s income. In this 
paper,    is the direct measure of women’s decision-making power,     is interpreted as income or expenditures 
under women’s control.   
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shares spent on individual items in order to account for the potential endogeneity. The 3SLS 
system equations are as follows:  
                 
               
                                                                       
    ,                       (3) 
where Exp denotes per capita household expenditure,  X1, X2 and X3 are the vectors of 
exogenous determinants in the three equations, and v1, v2, and v
g
 are the stochastic error terms. 
The exogenous variables (X1) in equation (3) include household size, household literature level 
as measured by the years of education of the most educated household member, and dummies for 
region;  X2 includes demographic and educational characteristics of the household head and 
household assets, and X3 includes household size and household demographic composition 
variables.  
I use per capita expenditure as a proxy for household income for two reasons. First, 
household income is often poorly measured in the survey data. Second, incomes of the poor in 
developing countries are often highly volatile due to factors such as the seasonality of agriculture 
and the sporadic nature of employment in the informal sector. However, household expenditure 
is unavoidably correlated with unobserved determinants of household budget shares and thus 
needs to be instrumented. θw is instrumented as well in order to estimate the causal relationship 
between θw and several dependent variables of interests (Friedberg and Webb 2006) because it is 
women’s perceived decision-making power. For non-budget share variables such as caloric 
availability and child education, I just use the regression (equation 4) instead of the structural 
form to examine the correlation between women’s decision making power and various human 
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development related indicators. The dependent variables thus are just a linear combination of 
related independent variables, including θw
3
.   
        w                 (4)   
in which, Y is the outcome variables, X is a set of covariates and   is the stochastic error 
term.  
 
3. Data and Key Variables 
3.1 Data 
This study uses the Pakistan Social and Living Standards Measurement Survey (PSLM) 
2005-06 to analyze the impact of women’s decision-making power on household expenditures, 
the composition of caloric availability, and child education. PSLM is a large household survey 
on a range of social issues, including education, health, immunization, women’s decision making, 
pre/postnatal care, and household consumption. The module on women’s decision making 
applies only to married women age 15 through 49; thus this study can use only a subset of the 
whole sample.  
More specifically, this study uses two samples to understand three different dimensions of 
human development in relation to women’s decision-making power in Pakistan. The first sample 
is at the household level, restricted to households that include married women age 15 through 49; 
the dependent variables are budget share controlled by each household head and caloric 
availability, including calories from different sources. The sample size is 7,938 households. The 
                                                          
3 Some recent literature (eg. Felkey A. J.  (2005) and Basu K. (2006) and Lancaster et. al. (2006)) shows that the 
relationship between women’s decision-making power and household outcomes is neither linear nor monotonic. 
Though the non-parametric graphical analysis in this paper shows non-monotonic relationship for a couple of 
outcome indicators, the parametric analysis assumes that the relationship is linear and monotonic.   
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second sample is at the individual level (children) and the dependent variable is the school 
enrollment of children age 5 through 15. The size of this sample is 17,696.   
 
3.2. Construction of women’s relative decision-making power (θw) 
There are eight questions in the PSLM survey regarding women’s decision making about 
their education, employment, use of birth control, having more children, and household food, 
clothing, medical treatment, and recreation expenditures for married women age 15 through 49. 
The answers to these questions are broadly categorized as ―woman decides alone,‖ ―household 
head or husband decides alone,‖ ―household head or husband and woman decide jointly,‖ and 
―other family members decide.‖ A woman is considered to have decision-making power on a 
particular issue if she jointly or by herself makes the decision (equal to 1), since on at least some 
issues, such as birth control or number of children, women do not have to have the sole decision-
making power. However, I have also done the calculations by assigning ―jointly making the 
decision‖ a weight of 0.5 or 0, and the results are very similar and available upon request. 
Similar scales are also applied to the influential male household members.  The results on 
distribution of women’s decision-making power are quite striking (see Table 1). For decisions on 
women’s own education, only 18% participated in this decision-making process (alone or in 
consultation with a male household member), but 86% of men in households participated in this 
decision (made the decision alone or in consultation with the woman). The results are very 
similar for decisions on women’s employment. Women have more to say about expenditures on 
food and clothing, but men still play the major decision-making role on those and other 
expenditures, particularly medical and recreation expenditures. For decisions on birth control and 
having more children, most men and women participated in the decision-making process. For 
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example, 81% of men and 70% of women are involved in the decision making on whether to use 
birth control.   Composite scores (ψw and ψm) are constructed with eight raw indicators for 
women and men separately, reflecting the degree of their autonomy. The scale for both scores 
ranges from 0 to 8, and the summary statistics are appended to the bottom of Table 1. Women’s 
relative decision-making power (θw) is constructed using the share of the women’s decision 
making (θw=ψw / (ψw+ψm )).There are two traditional measures of relative spousal power. The 
first commonly used is the female income share. A number of studies find that female income 
share has a significant effect on household expenditure patterns. For example, Hoddinott and 
Haddad (1995) found that when women’s share of household income increased, so did the 
budget share spent on food; and such households also spent less on more male-specific 
consumption items such as alcohol and cigarettes. Maitra and Ray (2002) found that the identity 
of the income earner has an important effect on expenditure share. However, as Basu (2006) 
points out, a measure based on income share might be endogenous to household decisions 
because a woman’s earnings are dependent upon her representation in the labor force, which is a 
choice variable for households and is influenced by the household’s decisions. In fact, the female 
labor force participation rate is very low (roughly 20 percent) in Pakistan, which makes using the 
earning share as a measure of women’s decision-making power almost impossible in this context. 
The second measure is the relative years of education or share of years of education (Gitter and 
Barham 2008). These measures assume that as women’s education level increases they are likely 
to have more decision-making power. I compare women’s decision-making power θw with years 
of education share and find a high correlation between years of education share and θw. Figure 1 
illustrates the relationship of these two measures in the household consumption sample. The 
relationship using the child sample shows a similar pattern, and the results are available upon 
10 
 
request. This paper argues that the direct measure θw is a better measure of women’s decision 
making than relative years of education. First, the constructed measurement θw has more 
frequency variation than the relative years of education measure, particularly for households in 
which women have fewer years of education. In Figure 2, the dashed line describes the 
distribution of women’s education share: there is a large percentage of women who have 
obtained little education, but women can still be very active in decision making even if they have 
little education. Second, share of education is a pre-existing condition, most likely before 
marriage, but women’s bargaining is a more dynamic process after marriage. Therefore, θw is a 
more comprehensive and more contemporary measure of women’s decision-making power.  
 
4. Results 
4.1 Unitary vs. collective model  
The study first tests whether the unitary model is rejected in Pakistan. Given the religious and 
cultural tradition, men seem to have more power within the household. However, this might be 
just a natural (though not justifiable) extension of the well-known limitations on women’s 
mobility; in most areas of Pakistan, women need to get permission from their husbands or male 
heads of households to pursue activities outside the household. Observations of households and 
casual communications with Pakistani families also reveal that men are likely to be in charge of 
more strategic household decisions while women are involved (at least) in decisions about daily 
life. This section tests the hypothesis that Pakistani households behave as a unitary model 
predicts – that the distribution of decision-making power within households has little impact on 
the share of the budget spent on a particular thing, such as food or health care. Following 
Lancaster (2005), if the hypothesis holds, the budget share spent will be determined by total 
household income, independent of bargaining power. Correspondingly, the sufficient condition 
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reflected in equation1 is   
 
   and   
 
 w    
 
    w . These are jointly tested to ensure 
∂bg/∂       Table 1 shows the Wald test results given selected  . A comparison with the 
critical (χ2) values among all budget share categories shows that the budget share is insensitive 
to household bargaining power. The results are consistent with previous evidence (Hoddinott and 
Haddad 1995; Lancaster, Maitra et al. 2006), suggesting that Pakistani households behave more 
as a collective model suggests. 
4.2. Budget share and women’s bargaining power 
Figure 3 depicts the relationship between b
g
 and   for the main expenditure categories, after 
controlling for per capita consumption. When women’s bargaining power increases, households 
are more likely to spend on footwear and clothing, medical care, and education. The case is very 
strong for education expenditures, implying that women are more likely to be the advocates for 
education when they have more power. The overall relationship between fuel and lighting share 
and women’s bargaining power indicates that when women have more dominant power in the 
household, households tend to spend more on fuel and lighting, but this is not the case when   is 
small. One possible explanation is that since women are involved in cooking, when they have 
more decision-making power they are more likely to spend on fuel/lighting in order to make the 
activities they are primarily engaged more pleasant. In contrast, the share of household income 
spent on transportation is smaller when women are more dominant, mainly because the mobility 
of women in most areas of Pakistan is restricted. The descriptive analysis overall suggests that, 
when women have more decision-making power, household preferences shift from food and 
transportation to education, medical care, footwear and clothing, and fuel and lighting.  Due to 
the presence of linear and quadratic terms involved in the budget share equation, it is not 
possible to infer the sensitivity of budget share to   simply by examining the statistical 
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significance of the linear coefficient estimate. Thus I use the regression analysis to examine the 
linear relationship between the budget share and             The regression analysis produces 
results similar to those in Figure 3. When women’s decision-making power increases, the share 
of the budget spent on footwear, clothing, and education increases. Different from the descriptive 
analysis, medical expenditures decrease when women’s power increases. The amount spent on 
medical care is affected by the overall well-being of household members and the practice of the 
preventive measures. If greater decision-making power enables women to make better nutrition 
and hygiene choices and take more preventive measures in the households, the households need 
for medical care may decrease.  The analysis by rural and urban areas reveals that the 
relationship between women’s power and budget share is different in these two areas. For 
example, when women have more power, households in rural areas spend more on fuel and 
lighting; but in urban areas households spend more on transportation. This suggests that women 
are more likely to spend on the activities they are more engaged in when they gain more power. 
However, in both urban and rural areas households spend more on education when women have 
more power. The coefficient between food share and women’s power is not significant for the 
overall sample and the rural sample, but it is negative for the urban sample. The literature 
contains different findings on this subject. For example, Hoddinott and Haddad (1995) finds that, 
in Cote d’Ivoire, women’s income is positively correlated with household necessities (such as 
food) but negatively with alcohol and cigarettes. However, Lancaster et al. (2005) suggest that 
the budget share and the women’s decision-making power is U-shaped instead of linear from 
their empirical analysis in India. Similarly, Maitra and Ray (2006) show that, in South Africa, it 
does not matter much who the income earner is for the purchase of food, clothing, and energy. In 
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the next subsection, this paper examines in more detail the relationship between women’s 
decision-making power and caloric availability.  
4.3. Caloric availability and women’s bargaining power  
Although the results presented so far show no significant association between food budget 
shares and women’s power for the overall sample, this finding is not automatically linked to the 
relationship between women’s power and food quantity and quality, which are more relevant to 
human development. Women may spend more efficiently on food consumption, purchasing more 
nutritious foods with less money, for example. Some evaluations of conditional cash transfer 
programs show that when women’s power increases as cash transfers going directly to women, 
households consume more calories (Attanasio and Lechene 2002; Djebbari 2005) and more 
nutritious calories (Hoddinott 1996; Hou 2010).  
This paper uses total caloric availability and caloric availability from different sources, 
such as calories from grains, calories from vegetables and fruits, calories from animal products, 
and calories from other sources to examine the relationship. Figure 4 shows the relationship 
between women’s power and caloric availability after controlling for per capita expenditure. 
After controlling for per capita expenditure, when women’s power increases, per capita calorie 
availability actually decreases. Calories from vegetables and fruits and calories from other 
sources increase, but calories from grains and animal products decrease.  
After controlling for other variables, the regression analysis (Table 4) shows similar 
results except for per capita caloric availability from animal products, which shows a strong 
positive correlation with women’s power. The breakdown of urban and rural analyses reveals 
similar relationships. These patterns suggest that when women have more power, households 
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tend to consume fewer but better calories—calories from a greater variety of sources, some of 
which are more nutritious—after controlling for household expenditures.  
4.4 The impact of women’s decision-making power on children’s school enrollment 
In this section, I examine the relationship between women’s bargaining power and children’s 
school enrollment. It is commonly believed that school enrollment increases if women become 
more powerful in the household decision-making process. However, some recent literature has 
challenged this view. Specifically, Basu’s (2006) theoretical model argues that ―if the woman 
has more decision-making power than the man, the woman will garner a greater share of the 
income produced by child labor and actually benefit from child labor.‖  That non-linear 
prediction was further supported by some empirical evidence, including Felkey (2005) in 
Bulgaria, Lancaster et al. (2005) in three states of India, and Gitter and Barban (2008) in 
Nicaragua.  Figure 5 clearly shows an upward linear relationship between women’s decision-
making power and child school enrollment. Such relationship by the non-parametric analysis is 
confirmed by the parametric analysis for which results are presented in Table 5. The finding is 
consistent with the classic views and the results of many empirical studies, including Schultz 
(1990) in Thailand, Thomas (1990) in Brazil, Binder (1999), and Adato et al. (2003) in Mexico. 
Table 5 also shows that when women have greater bargaining power, the girls are more likely 
than boys to be enrolled in school. Such gender-differentiated impacts are also consistent with 
the literature. For example, Thomas (1994) shows that Brazilian mothers’ non-wage income 
positively affected their daughters’ health but not their sons’.  Duflo (2003) shows that in South 
Africa the impacts of exogenous income transfers in the form of old-age pensions were more 
likely to increase health outcomes of granddaughters of grandmothers than any other 
15 
 
grandparent–grandchild relation. This finding implies that women in Pakistan are more likely to 
invest in education, particularly girls’ education, when they have more decision-making power.  
 
5. Conclusions  
The household is central to most policy initiatives aimed at reducing poverty. A clear 
understanding of the ways in which households make decisions is critical to the effective 
implementation of anti-poverty programs. Because a significant portion of economic activity 
occurs within the household, this is particularly important in developing countries, where there 
are efforts to seek the most efficient and effective ways to transfer income and other resources to 
poor households. Few studies have examined women’s bargaining power and human 
development outcomes in cultures where men’s power dominates and women are often perceived 
to have limited impacts on household decisions. Using data from Pakistan, this study finds that, 
similar to other countries, Pakistani households behave as a collective model would predict. 
Women participate in various decisions. The results that when women have more decision-
making power, household investments shift from food and transportation to education, medical 
care, footwear and clothing, and fuel and lighting. The relationship between women’s decision-
making power and education expenditures appears particularly strong. The relationship between 
changes in women’s power and changes in household expenditures differs slightly in rural and 
urban areas. For example, when rural women have more power, they tend to spend more on fuel 
and lighting, but women in urban households spend more on transportation. This result suggests 
that when women gain more power over decisions about household spending, they tend to spend 
more money on the activities they pursue the most. In both urban and rural areas, however, 
households spend more on education when women have more power.When women have more 
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power, households tend to consume better calories. Quality of food is as important as the 
quantity of food. When a women’s decision making power increases, there is no significant 
difference in per capita calorie availability, after controlling for household expenditures. 
However, families eat more calories from foods like fruits and vegetables and less from grains. 
This is to say that when a woman has more decision-making power, households tend to consume 
better calories. Women’s decision-making power on children’s education is quite robust. In 
households where women have greater decision-making power, the share of household income 
spent on education and children’s school enrollment is significantly higher, particularly for girls. 
The fact that women’s decision-making power is positively associated with nutrition and child 
schooling is important in policy design. When deciding who should receive welfare benefits, 
with the aim to increase household well-being, it is necessary to understand the effect of power 
distribution within the households at which the aid is directed. To mitigate the impact of the 
2008 food crisis, the government of Pakistan initiated the Benazir Income Support Program 
(BISP) to provide a safety net for the poor. This national cash transfer program provides Rs. 
1,000 per month to ever married women of eligible families. The rationale for transferring cash 
directly to women relies on two assumptions:  (1) as in other countries, giving cash directly to 
women can not only increase the total household income, but also increase women’s bargaining 
power as the cash transfers are perceived to be women’s additional income, and (2) higher 
women’s decision power is associated with higher human development investment within 
households. This study tests the second assumption using the existing data to understand the 
relationship between women’s bargaining power and some human development indicators, 
including nutrition and child education in Pakistan and the finding supports at least one aspect of 
the design of the program: transferring cash directly to women.    
17 
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Figure 1. Correlation between Women’s Decision-making Power and Women’s Education Share  
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Figure 2. A Density Graph of Women’s Decision-making Power (theta) and Women’s Education Share  
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Figure 3. Women’s Decision-making Power and Budget Share 
 
Note: Budget shares are the residual after controlling for log of household per capita expenditure. 
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Figure 4: Women’s Decision-making Power and per Capita Caloric Availability 
 
Note: Calorie availability is the residual after controlling for log of household per capita expenditure.  
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Figure 5. Women’s Decision-making Power and Children’s School Enrollment 
 
 
Note: Child school enrollment variables are the residual after controlling for log of household per capita 
expenditure. 
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 Table 1. Distribution of Household Decision-making Power  
  Men Women 
Decision mean sd mean sd 
Women's education  0.86 0.35 0.18 0.39 
Women's employment 0.87 0.34 0.17 0.38 
Food expenditure 0.67 0.47 0.35 0.48 
Clothing expenditure 0.65 0.48 0.41 0.49 
Medical expenditure 0.84 0.37 0.29 0.45 
Recreation expenditure 0.88 0.32 0.25 0.43 
Birth control method 0.81 0.39 0.70 0.46 
Having more children 0.87 0.34 0.75 0.43 
Composite score 6.619 1.77 3.038 2.1 
Sample size (households) 7,938       
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Table 2: Structural Model Estimation of the Impact of Women’s Decision-making Power on Budget Share  
  Food  
Fuel and 
lighting  Transportation  
Food and 
clothing  
Medical 
care  Education  
Theta -6.442*** -0.551*** 1.897*** -0.369*** -0.566*** 2.059*** 
 [0.217] [0.063] [0.088] [0.041] [0.087] [0.084] 
Theta(Theta * log 
of per capita 
expenditure) 
0.403*** 0.038*** -0.122*** 0.022*** 0.034*** -0.126*** 
[0.015] [0.004] [0.006] [0.003] [0.006] [0.006] 
(1-Theta)(1-
Theta) * log of 
per capita 
expenditure 
-0.448*** -0.035*** 0.131*** -0.027*** -0.040*** 0.143*** 
[0.015] [0.004] [0.006] [0.003] [0.006] [0.006] 
Ln (# of peple in 
HH) -0.026*** -0.018*** 0.004** 0.003*** 0.002 0.020*** 
 [0.004] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] 
Observations 7,919 7,919 7,919 7,919 7,919 7,919 
       
Wald test  Food  
Fuel and 
lighting  Transportation  
Food and 
clothing  
Medical 
care  Education  
Theta=0 934.7c 108.5c 484.5c 129.1c 51.7c 644.1c 
Theta=0.2 892.7c 129.4c 473.5c 113.2c 46.4c 608.3c 
Theta=0.4 963.8c 139.2c 467.6c 82.2c 45.6c 743c 
Theta=0.5 1067.8c 104.6c 485.6c 99.6c 55.1c 859.5c 
Theta=0.6 1095.6c 84.3c 496.3c 118.5c 60c 872.5c 
Theta=0.8 1081.8c 75.9c 501c 132.9c 61.6c 835.6c 
Theta=1 1065.9c 76c 501c 136.8c 61.3c 809.4c 
Note: 1. Absolute value of z statistics in brackets. 2. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. 3. Other variables controlled for but not presented include household size, 
demographic characteristics of household members, ownership of assets, and regional fixed effect. 
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Table 3. Regression Estimation of the Impact of Women’s Decision-making power on Budget Share  
  Food  Fuel and lighting  Transportation  Food and clothing  Medical care  Education  
Theta -0.074 -0.081*** -0.123*** 0.016 -0.242*** 0.366*** 
 [0.056] [0.023] [0.032] [0.015] [0.033] [0.028] 
Ln (# of peple in HH) -0.010*** -0.014*** -0.001 0.002** 0.002 0.019*** 
 [0.004] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] 
Ln (per capita consumption expenditure) -0.134*** -0.010*** 0.050*** -0.013*** 0.001 0.020*** 
 [0.005] [0.002] [0.003] [0.001] [0.003] [0.003] 
Observations 5,104 5,104 5,104 5,104 5,104 5,104 
Rural              
Theta 0.082 0.122*** -0.432*** 0.083*** -0.202*** 0.223*** 
 [0.082] [0.033] [0.048] [0.022] [0.050] [0.031] 
Ln (# of peple in HH) -0.001 -0.019*** 0.002 0.001 -0.000 0.013*** 
 [0.005] [0.002] [0.003] [0.001] [0.003] [0.002] 
Ln (per capita consumption expenditure) -0.149*** -0.020*** 0.099*** -0.016*** -0.001 0.023*** 
 [0.009] [0.004] [0.006] [0.003] [0.006] [0.004] 
Observations 2,546 2,546 2,546 2,546 2,546 2,546 
Urban             
Theta -0.195*** -0.304*** 0.091** -0.022 -0.159*** 0.304*** 
 [0.062] [0.027] [0.037] [0.017] [0.033] [0.037] 
Ln (# of peple in HH) -0.021*** -0.014*** 0.004 0.003** 0.003 0.027*** 
 [0.005] [0.002] [0.003] [0.001] [0.003] [0.003] 
Ln (per capita consumption expenditure) -0.128*** -0.002 0.031*** -0.011*** -0.003 0.027*** 
 [0.005] [0.002] [0.003] [0.001] [0.003] [0.003] 
Observations 2,558 2,558 2,558 2,558 2,558 2,558 
Note: 1. Absolute value of z statistics in brackets. 2. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 3. Other variables controlled for but not presented include household size, demographic characteristics of household members, , ownership of assets, and regional fixed effect.  
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Table 4.  Regression Estimation of the Impact of Women’s Decision-making Power on Caloric Availability 
  Total Calories  
Calories 
from 
grain 
Calories 
from 
vegetables, 
fruits 
Calories 
from 
animal 
products 
Calories 
from other 
sources 
Theta -0.037 -0.175* 0.522*** 1.189*** 0.429*** 
 [0.071] [0.099] [0.116] [0.199] [0.070] 
Ln (# of people in HH) -0.069*** -0.016 -0.185*** 
-
0.083*** -0.157*** 
 [0.008] [0.011] [0.014] [0.022] [0.008] 
Ln (per capita consumption 
expenditure) 0.185*** -0.009 0.499*** 0.863*** 0.404*** 
 [0.010] [0.014] [0.016] [0.026] [0.010] 
Observations 7,919 7,894 7,907 7,078 7,919 
Rural            
Theta -0.143* -0.156 0.072 0.673** 0.095 
 [0.085] [0.116] [0.146] [0.267] [0.082] 
Ln (# of people in HH) -0.053*** -0.007 -0.175*** -0.086*** -0.140*** 
 [0.010] [0.014] [0.017] [0.029] [0.010] 
Ln (per capita consumption 
expenditure) 0.266*** 0.099*** 0.690*** 0.979*** 0.505*** 
 [0.016] [0.022] [0.028] [0.048] [0.016] 
Observations 4,685 4,674 4,675 4,052 4,685 
Urban           
Theta -0.079 -0.564*** 0.900*** 1.646*** 0.673*** 
 [0.116] [0.163] [0.177] [0.285] [0.118] 
Ln (# of people in HH) -0.095*** -0.037* 
-
0.187*** -0.050 -0.175*** 
 [0.014] [0.020] [0.022] [0.034] [0.014] 
Ln (per capita consumption 
expenditure) 0.156*** -0.035* 0.417*** 0.807*** 0.358*** 
 [0.013] [0.019] [0.020] [0.032] [0.014] 
Observations 3,234 3,220 3,232 3,026 3,234 
Note: 1. Absolute value of z statistics in brackets. 2. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. 3. Other variables controlled for but not presented include household size, 
demographic characteristics of household members, , ownership of assets, and regional fixed effect. 
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Table 5. Regression Estimation of the Impact of Women’s Decision-making Power on Child School 
Enrollment  
  Children Girls Boys 
Theta 0.489*** 0.779*** 0.237** 
 [0.074] [0.108] [0.099] 
Ln (per capita consumption 
expenditure) 0.400*** 0.431*** 0.367*** 
 [0.011] [0.016] [0.014] 
Age 0.235*** 0.213*** 0.249*** 
 [0.008] [0.011] [0.010] 
Ln (# of people in HH) 0.040*** 0.019 0.053*** 
 [0.009] [0.014] [0.012] 
Observations 17,696 8,569 9,127 
Note: 1. Absolute value of z statistics in brackets. 2. * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%3. Other variables controlled for but 
not presented include child age, child age square, female, household size, 
demographic characteristics of household members, household’s asset 
composition, and region fixed effect.   
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Appendix Table 1. Summary Statistics for Household Sample 
Variable Name  Mean SD 
Theta 0.299 0.21 
Food expenditure share 0.486 0.12 
Fuel and lighting expenditure share 0.087 0.04 
Transportation fee expenditure share 0.055 0.05 
Foot and clothing expenditure share 0.061 0.03 
Medical care expenditure share 0.043 0.06 
Education expenditure share 0.027 0.05 
Per capita total food caloric availability 1852.237 762.66 
Per capita caloric availability from grains 1180.939 510.03 
Per capita caloric availability from vegetables and fruits 51.768 70.33 
Per capita caloric availability from animal products 25.353 24.83 
Per capita caloric availability from other sources 600.725 485.03 
Per equivalent adult expenditure (Rs.) 1743.577 1685.45 
# of people in HH (members only) 7.468 3.61 
Household highest no. of school years 8.08 5.15 
Punjab  0.42 0.49 
Sindh 0.249 0.43 
NWFP 0.195 0.4 
Rural 0.602 0.49 
Household head age 45.135 13.49 
Household head worked last month 0.829 0.38 
Household head female 0.072 0.26 
Household head married 0.919 0.27 
Household head years of schooling  4.831 5.43 
Agricultural land ownership 0.091 0.29 
Ownership of buffalo/camel/horse/asses/ mules 0.201 0.4 
Ownership of cattle/sheep/goat 0.221 0.41 
Ownership of fridge/freezer  0.346 0.48 
Ownership of air conditioner  0.156 0.36 
Ownership of cooking stove  0.324 0.47 
Ownership of TV 0.485 0.5 
Ownership of car/truck 0.047 0.21 
Ownership of motorcycle  0.131 0.34 
Computer ownership 0.055 0.23 
Ratio of female people between 0 and 5 years old in HH 0.08 0.11 
Ratio of male people between 0 and 5 years old in HH 0.083 0.12 
Ratio of female people between 5 and 15 years old in HH 0.126 0.14 
Ratio of male people between 5 and 15 years old in HH 0.136 0.14 
Ratio of female people between 15 and 55 years old in HH 0.268 0.13 
Ratio of male people between 15 and 55 years old in HH 0.239 0.14 
Ratio of female people older than 55 years old in HH 0.032 0.07 
Sample size 7,938   
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Appendix Table2. Summary Statistics for Child Sample 
Variable Name Mean  SD 
Theta 0.286 0.21 
Child enrollment status 0.625 0.48 
Per equivalent adult expenditure 1472.118 1306.32 
Child's age 9.436 3.11 
Child's age^2/100 0.987 0.62 
Girl 0.484 0.5 
# of people in HH (members only) 9.368 4.74 
Household highest no. of school years 7.904 4.83 
Punjab 0.366 0.48 
Sindh 0.243 0.43 
NWFP 0.23 0.42 
Rural 0.627 0.48 
Household head age 44.869 11.83 
Household head worked last month 0.852 0.36 
Household head female 0.067 0.25 
Household head married 0.945 0.23 
Household head years of schooling  4.493 5.32 
Agricultural land ownership 0.089 0.28 
Ownership of buffalo/camel/horse/asses/ mules 0.216 0.41 
Ownership of cattle/sheep/goat 0.247 0.43 
Ownership of fridge/freezer  0.331 0.47 
Ownership of air conditioner  0.14 0.35 
Ownership of cooking stove  0.288 0.45 
Ownership of TV 0.463 0.5 
Ownership of car/truck 0.044 0.2 
Ownership of motorcycle  0.128 0.33 
Computer ownership 0.042 0.2 
Ratio of female people between 0 and 5 years old in HH 0.08 0.1 
Ratio of male people between 0 and 5 years old in HH 0.084 0.1 
Ratio of female people between 5 and 15 years old in HH 0.193 0.13 
Ratio of male people between 5 and 15 years old in HH 0.206 0.14 
Ratio of female people between 15 and 55 years old in 
HH 0.203 0.09 
Ratio of male people between 15 and 55 years old in HH 0.189 0.1 
Ratio of female people older than 55 years old in HH 0.022 0.04 
Sample size 17,739   
 
 
 
